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TRUTH IN LENDING ACT-DEFENDANT'S DEBT
COUNTERCLAIM-COMPULSORY OR
PERMISSIVE?
Courts do not agree whether creditor counterclaims for the balance due
on credit contracts are compulsory or permissive counterclaims in consumer
suits under the federal Truth in Lending Act. The confusion arises from the
apparently conflicting policies of the Act and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. However, careful analysis reveals that the policies behind Rule 13
and the Act are better served if the counterclaim is considered permissive and
is not afforded the ancillary jurisdiction of the federal courts.
THE FEDERAL TRUTH IN LENDING ACT' requires lenders in
consumer credit transactions to disclose specific information
concerning the terms of the credit extended.2 As part of the statutory
enforcement scheme, the Act provides for private suits in federal or
state court against creditors who fail to provide the required informa-
tion. 3 Under the Act a consumer suing a creditor for disclosure viola-
tions is entitled to statutory damages, actual damages,4 and/or statutory
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-65 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), as amended by Act of Feb. 27,
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-222, § 3(b), 90 Stat. 197; Act of Mar. 23, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-240,
§ 4, 90 Stat. 260. The Truth in Lending Act is Title I of the Consumer Credit Protection
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-81t (1970 & Supp. V 1975), as amended by Act of Feb. 27, 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-222, § 3(b), 90 Stat. 197; Act of Mar. 23, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-240, § 4,
90 Stat. 260.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), as amended by Act of Feb. 27, 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-222, § 3(b), 90 Stat. 197; Act of Mar. 23, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-240, § 4, 90
Stat. 260, provides: "It is the purpose of this subchapter to assure a meaningful disclo-
sure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the
various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit .... "See
Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 276-77 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), as amended by Act of Feb. 27, 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-222, § 3(b), 90 Stat. 197; Act of Mar. 23, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-240, § 4, 90
Stat. 260. In addition to private enforcement, the Act also provides for enforcement by
various federal agencies, primarily the Federal Trade Commission. 15 U.S.C. § 1607
(1970 & Supp. V 1975).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975), as amended by Act of Feb. 27, 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-222, § 3(b), 90 Stat. 197; Act of Mar. 23, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-240, § 4, 90
Stat. 260, provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, any creditor who fails to
comply with any requirement imposed under this part or part D or E of this
subchapter with respect to any person is liable to such person in an amount
equal to the sum of -
(1) any actual damage sustained by such person as a result of
the failure;
(2)(A)(i) in the case of an individual action twice the amount
of any finance charge in connection with the transaction, or (ii)
in the case of an individual action relating to a consumer lease
under part E of this subchapter, 25 per centum of the total
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rescission. 5
When a debtor, who still owes money under the credit agreement,
brings an action in federal court for statutory damages under the Act, it
is likely that the creditor will counterclaim for the balance due. 6 It is
unlikely that the counterclaim will satisfy the statutory requirements
for independent federal jurisdiction.7 However, if the lender's
counterclaim in the Truth in Lending action is compulsory it will be
accorded the ancillary jurisdiction of the court.8 Rule 13(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a defendant's counter-
claim is compulsory if it arises from the same "transaction or occur-
rence" as the plaintiff's claim. 9 It is generally agreed that these words
should be liberally interpreted in order to allow the disposition of all
related claims in a single action. 10 At the first level of inquiry, it
appears that this test of compulsoriness is met since both claim and
counterclaim arise from the extension of credit to the debtor.
amount of Inonthly payments under the lease, except that the
liability under this subparagraph shall not be less than $100 nor
greater than $1,000; or
(B) in the case of a class action, such amount as the court
may allow, except that as to each member of the class no
minimum recovery shall be applicable, and the total recovery in
such action shall not be more than the lesser of $500,000 or 1
per centum of the net worth of the creditor; and
(3) in the case of any successful action to enforce the
foregoing liability, the costs of the action, together with a
reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the court.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), as amended by Act of Feb. 27, 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-222, § 3(b), 90 Stat. 197; Act of Mar. 23, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-240, § 4,90
Stat. 260. Statutory rescission is available only when a security interest is created in"'the
residence of the person to whom credit is extended." Id. See note 45 infra, 'which
considers the concurrent availability of § 1640 civil damages and § 1635 statutory
rescission.
6. See Zeltzer v. Carte Blanche Corp., 414 F. Supp. 1221 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Mims v.
Dixie Fin. Corp., 21 F.R. Serv. 2d 1042 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Agostine v. Sidcon Corp., 69
F.R.D. 437 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Ball v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 404 F. Supp. I (D.
Conn. 1975); Roberts v. National School of Radio & Television Broadcasting, 374 F.
Supp. 1266 (N.D. Ga. 1974), overruled by Mims v. Dixie Fin. Corp., 21 F.R. Serv. 2d
1042 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
7. Since the creditor's debt collection claim will arise under state law, federal
jurisdiction would be based on diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970). It
is improbable, however, that the claim will satisfy the $10,000 jurisdictional requirement.
8. Lacking independent federal jurisdictional grounds, a permissive counterclaim
will not be entertained. See note 23 infra.
9. Rule 13(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Compulsory Counterclaims,
provides: "A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which. . . the pleader has
against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the opposing party's claim. .. ."
10. C. WRiHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTIcE & PROCEDURE 40 (1971), and cases
cited therein. Rule 13 is intended "to dispose of the entire subject matter arising from
one set of facts in one action, thus administering complete and even handed justice
19781
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The policy underlying the Truth in Lending Act, however,
conflicts with this result. The statutory damage provision of the Act
has been viewed by the courts as a penalty assessed against violating
lenders rather than as a compensatory provision intended to make the
borrower whole." In addition, a consumer suing under the Act has
also been characterized as a "private attorney general" whose role, by
design of the Act, is to prominently participate in the statute's enforce-
ment. 12 Allowing defendants' debt counterclaims would deter consum-
ers from bringing such suits, and thus would be detrimental to the
private enforcement provisions of the Act.
As a result of this tension between the Federal Rules and the Truth
in Lending Act, judges have been unable to agree whether the debt
counterclaim is compulsory or permissive. 13 The purpose of this Note
is to examine the court decisions in light of the policies involved, and
to study the differing rationales adopted, in an attempt to establish a
logical analysis of the problem. This analysis will demonstrate that in
the context of a statutory penalty suit, a defendant's debt counterclaim
is nxerely permissive and should not be incorporated into the Truth in
Lending action. This result is supported not only by policy considera-
tions under the Truth in Lending Act, but also by a proper application
of the Federal Rules.
I. THE BASIS OF THE CONFLICT
A. Rule 13
Rule 13 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to
assert counterclaims in response to the opposing party's claims. The
present rule derives from, and expands upon, the basic philosophy of
the common law doctrines of set-off and recoupment.' 4 Rule 13 has
been interpreted as providing the courts with broad discretion 15 to join
claims in order to facilitate the resolution of all controversies between
the parties in a single suit. 16 Judges use the rule to avoid the inefficien-
expeditiously and economically." Blair v. Cleveland Twist Drill Co., 197 F.2d 842, 845
(7th Cir. 1952).
11. Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 376 (1973).
12. Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270,280 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
13. See note 6 supra.
14. 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 10, at 8. See 3 T. SEOGWICK, DAMAGES §§
1033, 1042 (9th ed. 1912); 3 J. STORY, EQurrY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 1870, 1878 (14th ed.
1918).
15. Parmelee v. Chicago Eye Shield Co., 157 F.2d 582 (8th Cir. 1946); Collins v.
Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1939); Waltham Indus. Corp. v.
Thompson, 53 F.R.D. 93 (D. Conn. 1971).
16. Montecatini Edison, S.P.A. v. Ziegler, 486 F.2d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1973); LASA
436 (Vol. 28:434
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cies of multiple litigation:'" "The objective of the Federal Rules with
respect to counterclaims is to provide complete relief to the parties, to
conserve judicial resources and to avoid the proliferation of law-
suits." 18
The reasons for the creditor in a Truth in Lending action to
counterclaim for the amount owing are largely the same as those
prompting any counterclaim. Since the creditor is already in court to
defend the action, it is an economically appropriate time, in terms of
litigation expenses, for him to assert his claim. Also, the creditor may
reasonably fear that if the counterclaim is not presently asserted it may
be barred in a subsequent suit. 19 Finally, a creditor forced to pay
money damages in a Truth in Lending suit may later find the debtor
unable to pay a judgment won by the creditor in a subsequent action on
the debt. 20
If a creditor could establish independent grounds for federal juris-
diction, a determination of the nature of the counterclaim would be
unnecessary. Typically, however, a creditor's counterclaim will not
satisfy federal jurisdictional requirements. 2 ' If the counterclaim is held
to be merely permissive 22 it will not be entertained as the courts have
consistently held that permissive counterclaims must be supported by
independent grounds of federal subject matter jurisdiction.23 Should
Per L'Industria Del Marmo Societa Per Azioni v. Alexander, 414 F.2d 143 (6th Cir.
1969); Stewart-Warner Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 325 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 944 (1964); Blair v. Cleveland Twist Drill Co., 197 F.2d 842 (7th
Cir. 1952).
17. Aviation Materials, Inc. v. Pinney, 65 F.R.D. 357 (N.D. Okla. 1975); Tasner v.
Billera, 379 F. Supp. 809 (N.D. Ill. 1974); James B. Day & Co. v. Reichhold Chems.,
Inc., 60 F.R.D. 387 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Avondale Shipyards, Inc. v. Propulsion Sys., Inc.,
53 F.R.D. 341 (E.D. La. 1971); Waltham Indus. Corp. v. Thompson, 53 F.R.D. 93 (D.
Conn. 1971).
18. Montecatini Edison, S.P.A. v. Ziegler, 486 F.2d 1279, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
19. If the unasserted counterclaim is held to be compulsory, it will be barred in a
later, independent federal action. Pipeliners Local No. 798 v. Ellerd, 503 F.2d 1193 (10th
Cir. 1974); Tolson v. Hodge, 411 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1969); New Britain Mach. Co. v. Yeo,
358 F.2d 397 (6th Cir. 1966); National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Fowler, 287 F.2d 43 (2d Cir.
1961).
When the subsequent suit is brought in state court, the state court may reach the
same result. London v. City of Philadelphia, 412 Pa. 496, 194 A.2d 901 (1963); Home v.
Woolever, 170 Ohio St. 178, 163 N.E.2d 378 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 951 (1960);
Meacham v. Haley, 38 Tenn. App. 20, 270 S.W.2d 503 (1954). See 6 C. WRIorr & A.
MILLER, supra note 10, at 94-95.
20. See Mims v. Dixie Fin. Corp., 426 F. Supp. 627, 634 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
21. See note 7 supra.
22. Rule 13(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Permissive Counterclaims,
states: "A pleading may state as a counterclaim any claim against an opposing party not
arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing
party's claim."
23. See, e.g., Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
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the counterclaim be held compulsory, however, it would be heard
despite the absence of independent jurisdictional grounds since it
would then fall within the courts' ancillary jurisdiction.24 In determin-
ing whether a counterclaim is compulsory, and therefore comes within
the courts' ancillary jurisdiction, the court must apply the deceptively
simple "transaction or occurrence" test provided in Rule 13(a).25
A literal application of Rule 13 in the context of a Truth in Lending
counterclaim appears to present little difficulty. The claims of both
parties center around the same consumer credit transaction. This exten-
sion of credit, from which both parties' claims derive, is apparently a
single transaction or occurrence as required by Rule 13(a). 26 Accord-
ingly, it seems that defendant's counterclaim is compulsory and there-
fore falls under the ancillary jurisdiction of the court.
In applying Rule 13(a), however, the courts have largely refrained
from explicitly defining this test in order to maintain a liberal and
flexible standard. 27 Instead, the courts have suggested four subtests to
determine whether or not a specific counterclaim is compulsory:
1) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and
counterclaim largely the same?
2) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant's
claim absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?
3) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute
plaintiff's claim as well as defendant's counterclaim?
4) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the
counterclaim?
In the case of each of these tests, an affirmative answer to
the question posed means that the counterclaim is compul-
sory.28
419 U.S. 1070 (1974); Autographic Register Co. v. Philip Hano Co., 198 F.2d 208 (1st Cir.
1952).
24. Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S. 467, 469 n.1 (1974); Mayer Paving&
Asphalt Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 486 F.2d 763 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146
(1974); United States ex reL D'Agostino Excavators, Inc. v. Heyward-Robinson Co., 430
F.2d 1077 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1021 (1971).
This is not to suggest that Rule 13(a) extends federal jurisdiction to compulsory
counterclaims, but rather that the tests for ancillary jurisdiction and for compulsory
counterclaims are the same. The tests are identical because both Rule 13(a) and the
doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction are designed to eliminate the same evil-piecemeal
litigation. Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631 (1961).
25. Rule 13(a). provides that a compulsory counterclaim must arise "out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim."
26. See Mims v. Dixie Fin. Corp., 21 F.R. Serv. 2d 1042 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Gibson v.
Family Fin. Corp., 404 F. Supp. 896 (E.D. La. 1975); Kenney v. Landis Fin. Group,
Inc., 376 F. Supp. 852 (N.D. Iowa 1974).
27. 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 10, at 40-41.
28. Id. at 42-43. These subtests have been approved and applied in the context of
debt counterclaims in Truth in Lending suits. Mims v. Dixie Fin. Corp., 21 F.R.
Serv. 2d 1042 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Roberts v. National School of Radio & Television
[Vol. 28:434
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Using these guides, the courts require some appreciable gain in judicial
economy-the goal of the Federal Rules generally 29 and of Rule 13 in
particular-before finding a counterclaim to be compulsory.
Analysis of the cases demonstrates that no such gain is realized by
allowing a creditor's counterclaim to be heard in a Truth in Lending
proceeding. Use of the judicial subtests for compulsoriness serves to
expose the real differences in the claims' transactional origins.
Moreover, rejecting a creditor's debt counterclaim and holding it to be
merely permissive is more consistent with the policies underlying the
Truth in Lending Act.
B. The Truth in Lending Act
The Truth in Lending Act was the legislative solution to the
problem of the uninformed use of credit by consumers.30 Congress
realized that because of the nonuniform and confusing manner in
which credit terms were being presented, consumers were largely
unaware of the true cost of credit, particularly the annual rate being
charged.31 The Truth in Lending Act was intended to remedy this
situation by requiring creditors to provide consumers with the informa-
tion necessary to make informed credit decisions. 32
Section 1601 clearly identifies the two objectives of the Act.33
Broadcasting, 374 F. Supp. 1266 (N.D. Ga. 1974), overruled by Mims v. Dixie Fin.
Corp., 21 F.R. Serv. 2d 1042 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
29. Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides: "[These rules] shall be
construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."
30. H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1962, 1964-66.
Passage of the Truth in Lending Act in 1968 culminated several years of
congressional study and debate as to the propriety and usefulness of imposing
mandatory disclosure requirements on those who extend credit to consumers in
the American market. By the time of passage, it had become abundantly clear
that the use of consumer credit was expanding at an extremely rapid rate. From
the end of World War II through 1967, the amount of such credit outstanding
had increased from $5.6 billion to $95.9 billion, a rate of growth more than 4 1/2
times as great as that of the economy. Yet, as the congressional hearings
revealed, consumers remained remarkably ignorant of the nature of their credit
obligations and of the costs of deferring payment. Bedause of the divergent,
and at times fraudulent, practices by which consumers were informed of the
terms of the credit extended to them, many consumers were prevented from
shopping for the best terms available and, at times, were prompted to assume
liabilities they could not meet.
Mourning v. Family Publication Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 363 (1973) (footnotes omit-
ted).
31. Id.
32. See 114 CONG. REc. 9642 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Daniel B. Brewster).
33. See note 2 supra. See also Comment, Private Remedies Under the Truth-in-
Lending Act: The Relationship Between Rescission and Civil Liability, 57 IowA L. REV.
199, 199-200 (1971).
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First, the Act seeks to require the disclosure of credit terms in a manner
which can be understood by the average consumer. Second, the statute
contemplates that by requiring disclosure of credit terms in a specified
manner, the consumer will be able to effectively shop for credit
through comparison of credit "prices." 34 The Act does not attempt to
regulate finance charges 35 and leaves control over credit terms and the
manner of debt repayment to state law. 36 Thus, the Truth in Lending
Act is solely a disclosure statute designed to ensure that consumers
receive specific information in a structured manner. 37
At the outset, the two houses of Congress differed with respect to
the Act's enforcement. The Senate envisioned enforcement solely by
private consumer suits for a civil penalty against violating lenders. 38 In
contrast, the House believed that enforcement by unsophisticated
consumers would be ineffective and therefore thought administrative
enforcement was necessary. 39 Ultimately, both consumer and adminis-
trative enforcement provisions were incorporated into the resulting
conference report. 4°
The civil remedies specified in the Act allow a debtor suing a
creditor for disclosure violations to recover statutory damages, actual
damages, and, in certain instances, to obtain statutory rescission.41 It is
important to understand the statutory damage remedy because it is in
that context that creditors' counterclaims have arisen.42 In Bostwick v.
34. It will be observed that although the Act is intended to achieve both goals, only
the first function is directly effected and enforced. The second objective is the indirect
and consequential result of implementing the first.
35. See Tanner, Truth in Lending and Regulation Z-A Primer, 6 GA. ST.B.J. 19
(1969).
36. See Boyd, The Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act-A Consumer Perspec-
tive, 45 NOTRE DAME LAW. 171, 174 (1970).
37. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1637-39 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226
(1977).
38. S. REP. No. 392, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1967); 113 CONG. REC. 18409 (1967)
(remarks of Sen. Bennet); 113 CONG. REc. 18413 (1967) (remarks of Sen. McIntyre); 114
CONG. REC. 1433 (1968) (remarks of Rep. Sullivan).
39. H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD.NEWS 1962, 1975-76. Although the House felt administrative action would
be the primary means of enforcement, it also provided for the civil liability of lenders in
consumer suits. 114 CONG. REC. 1427 (1968) (remarks of Rep. Patman); H.R. 11601, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 206(a), 113 CONG. REC. 19615 (1967); see also H.R. REP. No. 1040,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1962, 1976.
40. 114 CONG. REC. 14489 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire); id. at 14387 (remarks
of Rep. Sullivan).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975), as amended by Act of Feb. 27, 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-222, § 3(b), 90 Stat. 197; Act of Mar. 23, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-240, § 4,90
Stat. 260; 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). See note 5 supra.
42. See note 6 supra.
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Cohen,43 an early opinion concerning the concurrent allowance of
section 1635 rescission and section 1640 damages, the court proceeded
on the theory that section 1640 was designed to provide a remedy for
aggrieved debtors and was not punitive in nature. 44 The court relied on
legislative history indicating that administrative action should be the
primary method of enforcement, and that the minimum and double
recovery provisions of section 1640(a) were intended solely as an
incentive for private suits.45
Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co.46 subsequently
eroded this position by holding that whether or not the consumer incurs
a finance charge is irrelevant to the creditor's liability under section
1640. The court found that the creditor's liability was grounded solely
upon his failure to disclose the required information. 47 According to
43. 319 F. Supp. 875 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
44. Id. at 877-78.
45. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on an early House report:
"While primary enforcement of the bill would be accomplished under the administrative
enforcement section. . . , further provision is made for the institution of civil action by
an aggrieved debtor." H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in [1968]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1962, 1976. See White v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 374
F. Supp. 151, 157-58 (D. Md. 1974).
The Bostwick court also held that since the statutory damage provision in § 1640 was
primarily remedial, it was inconsistent with rescission and would thus not be concurrent-
ly granted. 319 F. Supp. at 878. The Truth in Lending Act does not specify whether §
1640 civil penalties and § 1635 rescission are mutually exclusive or concurrent remedies.
See Palmer v. Wilson, 359 F. Supp. 1099, 1103-04 (N.D. Cal. 1973), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 502 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1974); Bostwick v. Cohen, 319 F.
Supp. 875, 877-78 (N.D. Ohio 1970). Bostwick was the first judicial resolution of this
issue, holding that absent congressional direction to the contrary, the common law
doctrine of election of remedies was applicable. This view was later abandoned by
decisions interpreting § 1640 as a penalty provision and permitting § 1635 rescission as a
concurrent remedy. Eby v. Reb Realty, Inc., 495 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1974); Palmer v.
Wilson, 359 F. Supp. 1099, 1103-04 (N.D. Cal. 1973), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 502 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1974). From the beginning commentators have strongly
argued for allowing § 1635 rescission and § 1640 damages concurrently. Note, Truth in
Lending Act Litigation: Concurrent Recourse to Rescission and the Civil Penalty, 43
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 840 (1975); Comment, supra note 33.
46. 329 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
47. Id. at 280. The opinion also contains language supporting the Bostwick view:
"While the contexts differ; this court follows the only previously reported decision in
holding the provision for civil recoveries 'remedial' rather than 'penal.' Bostwick v.
Cohen, supra." Id. at 282. It is interesting to note that the court employed this conflict-
ing analysis to the benefit of the consumer. The court first found the provision implicitly
penal in nature in order to allow the plaintiff's recovery despite the absence of actual
injury. Then, in order to defeat the defendant's argument that his "reasonable" violation
should not be subject to a "penalty," the court found that the 'remedial' character of
the provision for civil recoveries quite overwhelms its allegedly 'penal' aspect." Id. The
Ratner court appears to be cleverly equivocal in its use of the term "remedial." Since no
actual injury was shown, recovery can hardly be described as remedial to this particular
plaintiff. If the imposition of damages is considered remedial to consumers as a whole
1978]
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the court, "[t]he scheme of the statute . . . is to create a species of
'private attorney general' to participate prominently in enforce-
ment. . .. [Congress] invited people like the present plaintiff,
whether they were themselves deceived or not, to sue in the public
interest. "8 Under this view, a plaintiff's recovery under section 1640
is not recovery for damages suffered on the credit contract, but rather a
penalty imposed on the creditor to enforce compliance with the disclo-
sure requirements of the Act.
The position established in Ratner is buttressed by the Supreme
Court's opinion in Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc. 49 In
Mourning the Court held that although no finance charge was as-
sessed, the civil liability under section 1640 could be imposed. 50 The
Court characterized the provision as a civil penalty, applicable simply
upon a showing of the creditor's failure to disclose.51 Later cases
reiterate this approach, finding no inconsistency in granting both the
civil penalty under section 1640 and statutory rescission. 52 Thus, case
law supports the characterization of the civil recovery provision as a
penalty to violating creditors rather than a remedy for aggrieved
debtors.
In addition to judicial support, the statute itself indicates that the
provision for civil damages is properly construed as a penalty for
violations of the Act. 53 The formula for recovery provided in section
(and to the disclosure problem attacked by the Act), then, from the defendant's point of
view, the provision is clearly penal.
48. 329 F. Supp. at 28 (footnotes omitted).
49. 411 U.S. 356 (1973).
50. Id. at 376. In Mourning the defendant had violated the disclosure requirements
of Federal Reserve Board's regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1977).
51. 411 U.S. at 376. The Court stated:
We are also unable to accept respondent's argument that [§ 1640] does not allow
imposition of a civil penalty in cases where no finance charge is involved but
where a regulation requiring disclosure has been violated. . . . Since the civil
penalty prescribed is modest and the prohibited conduct clearly set out in the
regulation, we need not construe this section as narrowly as a criminal statute
providing graver penalties, such as prison terms. .... In light of the emphasis
Congress placed on agency rulemaking and on private and administrative en-
forcement of the Act, we cannot conclude that Congress intended those who
failed to comply with regulations to be subject to no penalty or to criminal
penalties alone. . . . [I]mposition of the minimum sanction is proper in cases
such as this, where the finance charge is nonexistent or undetermined.
Id.
52. Palmer v. Wilson, 502 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1974); Eby v. Reb Realty, Inc., 495 F.2d
646 (9th Cir. 1974).
53. Statutory analysis of' § 1640 includes the following additional indications that §
1640(a)(2) is a penalty provision:
1) The defense for bona fide clerical errors provided in section 1640(c) is
consistent with a penalty construction of the damage provision.
2) The short statute of limitations specified in section 1640(e) is more appro-
priate for a punitive than a compensatory measure.
[Vol. 28:434
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1640(a)(2) bears no relation to the consumer's possible injury. 54
Analysis of the 1974 amendments5 5 to the Truth in Lending Act also
supports this construction. While retaining the prior statutory damage
provision, the amended version of section 1640(a) includes an added
provision imposing liability for any actual damages sustained by the
consumer as a result of the lender's disclosure violations.56 Allowing
both statutory civil damages and actual damages strongly supports the
conclusion that the original civil recovery provision should be viewed
as a penalty.
The foregoing analysis indicates that Congress viewed the civil
recovery provision of section 1640(a)(2) as a civil penalty not cal-
culated to make the borrower whole. Thus, when a borrower sues for
the civil penalty provided in section 1640(a)(2), he is acting not as an
individual seeking redress for damages suffered in the credit transac-
tion but as a private attorney general to force compliance with the
disclosure requirements of the Act. To allow the creditor to assert a
counterclaim on the debt owed under the credit contract would serious-
ly diminish consumers' incentive to bring such actions and thus would
undermine the private enforcement scheme incorporated into the Act.57
HI. THE CONFLICT IN THE COURTS: COUNTERCLAIMS
IN ACTIONS FOR STATUTORY DAMAGES
In Truth in Lending actions for the statutory penalty, the issue of
whether a creditor's counterclaim on the debt is compulsory, and thus
given ancillary jurisdiction, has not been treated uniformly by the
courts.5 8 The first decision to consider the conflicting policies of Rule
13 and the Truth in Lending Act was Roberts v. National School of
Radio & Television Broadcasting.59 In Roberts, the plaintiff student's
suit, filed under the Truth in Lending Act, alleged that the defendant
trade school had failed to adequately describe the credit terms of a note
3) The allowed recovery in section 1640(a)(3) for reasonable attorney's fees is
indicative of a penalty construction.
Note, Truth in Lending Act Litigation: Concurrent Recourse to Rescisson and the Civil
Penalty, 43 GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 840, 854-61 (1975).
54. The text of § 1640(a)(2) is set forth in note 4 supra.
55. Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1500.
56. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1) (1970 & Supp. V 1975), as amended by Act of Feb. 27,
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-222, § 3(b), 90 Stat. 197; Act of Mar. 23, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-240,
§ 4, 90 Stat. 260.
57. Zeltzer v. Carte Blanche Corp., 414 F. Supp. 1221 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Roberts v.
National School of Radio & Television Broadcasting, 374 F. Supp. 1266 (N.D. Ga. 1974),
overruled by Mims v. Dixie Fin. Corp., 21 F.R. Serv. 2d 1042 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
58. See note 6 supra.
59. 374 F. Supp. 1266 (1974), overruled by Mims v. Dixie Fin. Corp., 21 F.R. Serv.
2d 1042 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
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executed by the plaintiff for the installment payment of his tuition
loan. The court held that the defendant's counterclaim for the balance
due on the note was permissive, rather than compulsory. Although the
court iterated the four generally accepted subtests for determining
compulsoriness under Rule 13(a), 60 it did not expressly apply them.61
Instead, the court seemed to implicitly apply the primary transaction or
occurrence test of Rule 13(a). While noting that both the plaintiff and
defendant stated claims arising from the same transaction in the sense
that each was suing because of the other's obligations on the note, the
court hinted at a distinction between the transaction of disclosure and
that of credit extension. 62
The court's vague application of Rule 13 contrasts with its
straightforward determination of the result mandated by the Truth in
Lending Act. Judge Edenfield adopted both the Ratner characteriza-
tion of a Truth in Lending plaintiff as a "species of private attorneys
general" intended to participate prominently in the enforcement of the
Act63 and the Mourning position that the creditor's liability under the
Truth in Lending Act is to be viewed as a "penalty and a deterrent to
activity prohibited by Congress.' 64 The court thus viewed the plain-
tiff's suit more as a Truth in Lending enforcement proceeding than as a
private damage action. Consequently, the court refused to accept the
"incongruous result" of turning the enforcement suit into a forum for
the violator's private claims. 65 Moreover, to permit the defendant's
60. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
61. 374 F. Supp. at 1270. The court stated, in conclusory fashion: "The counter-
claim of the defendant in this case fails to meet any of the tests of compulsoriness under
Rule 13(a), Fed. R. Civ. P." Id. at 1271.
62. Id. The court did not expressly state its reasoning, but instead left it to infer-
ence:
The plaintiff's claim is that the defendant failed to make certain credit disclo-
sures in a financing agreement in accordance with TIL disclosure requirements.
The defendant's counterclaim is for the balance due on the note ...
.. .While both the plaintiff and the defendant state claims arising from the
same transaction in the sense that each party is suing because of the other's
obligations on the note, the plaintiff's claim is in furtherance of a stated federal
legislative policy. The defendant contends simply that plaintiff is in default on a
private duty.
Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. The court stated:
Given the remedial nature of TIL and the broad public policy which it serves,
federal courts should be loath to become immersed in the debt collection suits
of the target of the very legislation under which a TIL plaintiff states a cause of
action.
• . .To permit the defendant in a TIL action to utilize the proceedings
merely as a forum to state grievances against a debtor-plaintiff would be an
incongruous result and clearly prejudicial to the plaintiff's claim.
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counterclaim "would unduly complicate the expeditious resolution of
TIL litigation"---litigation designed to enforce the provisions of the
Act. The careful analysis of the policy behind the Truth in Lending
Act, coupled with the terse consideration given to Rule 13,67 leaves
little doubt that the former was the controlling factor in the court's
decision. While this sensitivity to the purpose and design of the Truth
in Lending Act is a desirable, indeed a necessary factor in reaching a
sound resolution of this issue, equal attention should be given to the
application of Rule 13 and its underlying policy. Failure to pursue this
line of analysis mars the Roberts decision. However, later cases
recognize the imperatives of the Federal Rules, and deal directly with
the impact of Rule 13 on this problem.
The recent case of Zeltzer v. Carte Blanche Corp.68 reached the
same result as Roberts, but undertook a more thorough analysis. In
Zeltzer the plaintiff alleged that the creditor failed to make the required
Truth in Lending disclosures in connection with a credit card purchase
of airline tickets. The defendant counterclaimed to recover the unpaid
balance on the plaintiff's credit card account. Judge Teitelbaum rea-
soned that, while the language of Rule 13(a) indicates that the
counterclaim should be held compulsory, allowing defendant's claim
would require the resolution of questions controlled solely by state
contract law. 69
The Zeltzer court admitted that "both claim and counterclaim arise
out of a singular occurrence, plaintiff's purchase of airline tickets
through the use of his Carte Blanche card.' '70 However, the court was
loath to expose the federal courts to a "flood-tide" of debt collection
counterclaims involving questions of no federal significance. 71 "[The
Court is asked by way of a defendant's counterclaim to try a cause of
66. Id. This rationale can also be interpreted as negating the possibility that any gain
in judicial efficiency would result from the determination that defendant's counterclaim
was compulsory.
67. Id. at 1270.
68. 414 F. Supp. 1221 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
69. Id. at 1222. The judge explained:
On one hand, the language of Rule 13(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure indicates that such counterclaims are compulsory and, as such,
require no independent basis for the exercise of federal jurisdiction, but must
be asserted by a defendant and heard by the court as falling within its ancillary
jurisdiction. On the other hand, important policy considerations-stemming
from a clear understanding that the federal judicial system rests on a concept of
limited jurisdiction, the expansion of which necessarily diminishes the power of
the states to adjudicate controversies governed by state law-dictate that
federal courts proceed cautiously in permitting the assertion of so-called "debt
collection" counterclaims in suits originally brought to recover on an exclu-
sively federal cause of action.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
70. Id. at 1223.
71. Id. at 1225.
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action amounting to no more than a state debt collection suit founded
on the same transaction or occurrence that generated plaintiff's exclu-
sively federal suit. .... ",72 This judicial reluctance to entertain state
law claims, echoing Roberts, has little relevance to a proper analysis
of this issue. As expressly stated in Roberts, "[t]he purpose of ancil-
lary jurisdiction is to enable a court with jurisdiction of the principal
action to hear also any ancillary proceedings therein, regardless...
of any . factor that would normally determine jurisdiction." 73 The
court should determine whether the defendant's counterclaim is or is
not compulsory, rather than look to the nature of the counterclaim.
74
The Zeltzer court apparently realized that its concern for the
limited jurisdiction of the federal courts would not justify wholesale
neglect of the Federal Rules. 75 In order to reconcile the apparent
confrontation between the text of Rule 13 and the underlying policy of
the Act, Judge Teitelbaum looked to one of the judicially developed
subtests 76 for classifying counterclaims. The court examined whether
a "logical relationship" existed between claim and counterclaim such
that the purpose of Rule 13(a)-judicial efficiency-would be promot-
ed by the extension of ancillary jurisdiction to the related counter-
claim. 77 No such logical relationship was found to exist:
[T]he factual issues are distinct. Plaintiff's claim entails
proof of a limited set of facts relating to the nature of the
disclosures made by the defendant. The counterclaim in-
volves proof of a contract, its validity, the record of pay-
72. Id. at 1222 (emphasis added).
73. 374 F. Supp. at 1270.
74. It is noteworthy that in analogous situations where the plaintiff asserts a claim
under a federal statute and the defendant's counterclaim arises under state law, the
courts have not hesitated to hold the counterclaim compulsory if it satisfies the transac-
tion or occurrence test of Rule 13(a). See Mayer Paving & Asphalt Co. v. General
Dynamics Corp., 486 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974); United
States v. Gerbus Bros. Constr. Co., 57 F.R.D. 206 (E.D. Ky. 1972).
75. 414 F. Supp. at 1225.
76. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
77. 414 F. Supp. at 1223. The court relied on the test used in Great Lakes Rubber
Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631 (3d Cir. 1961):
[A] counterclaim is compulsory if it bears a "logical relationship" to an oppos-
ing party's claim. The phrase "logical relationship" is given meaning by the
purpose of the rule which it was designed to implement. Thus, a counterclaim is
logically related to the opposing party's claim where separate trials on each of
their respective claims would involve a substantial duplication of effort and
time by the parties and the courts. Where multiple claims involve many of the
same factual issues, or the same factual and legal issues, or where they are
offshoots of the same basic controversy between the parties, fairness and
considerations of convenience and of economy require that the counterclaimant
be permitted to maintain his cause of action.
414 F. Supp. at 1223. The logical relation test is discussed in 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 46-48, 54 (1971).
[Vol. 28:434
TRUTH IN LENDING
ments and plaintiff's default. In these circumstances, where
claim and counterclaim lack even a close similarity of factual
and legal issues, . . . separate trials on each distinct claim
will not involve a "substantial duplication of effort and time
by the parties and the courts." 78
Thus, the apparently conflicting policies of the Rules and the Act are
convincingly integrated. The court avoids the derogation of the Rules
inherent in the Roberts approach and fulfills the underlying purpose of
the transaction test. This language also seems to recognize the distinc-
tion suggested in Roberts between the disclosure transaction, upon
which the plaintiff's claim is based, and the contract itself, upon which
the counterclaim is grounded.79 This distinction permits a literal appli-
cation of Rule 13.80
In harmony with the Zeltzer application of Rule 13 are Agostine v.
Sidcon Corp. 81 and Ball v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. ,82 holding
defendant debt counterclaims to be permissive. The court in Agostine
applied the recognized subtests 83 for compulsoriness and found that
the issues of fact and law encompassed by the plaintiff's claim and
defendant's counterclaim were quite different. 84 In addition, different
evidence would be necessary to support the two parties' claims: the
plaintiff would only need to show that the credit transaction took place
78. 414 F. Supp. at 1224.
79. The court also incorporates into its opinion the language from Roberts suggest-
ing the difference. 414 F. Supp. at 1225. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
80. Zeltzer was decided in the context of a class action. The court notes that
allowing defendant's debt counterclaim may add significantly to the complexity of the
suit. 414 F. Supp. at 1223 n.4. See Agostine v. Sidcon Corp., 69 F.R.D. 437 (E.D. Pa.
1975). The Zeltzer approach of dismissing defendant's counterclaims because they are
permissive contrasts with the approach taken in Rodriguez v. Family Publications Serv.,
57 F.R.D. 189 (C.D. Cal. 1972), a case factually analogous to Zeltzer. The Rodriguez
court denied plaintiff's motion to maintain the action as a class action because
"[c]ounterclaims by defendant for nonpayment of amounts due under the contracts,
Which would be compulsory counterclaims under Rule 13(a), would raise further difficul-
ties . . . ." Id. at 193. Refusing class action treatment, however, is contrary to the
statute which specifically contemplates damage awards in class suits. See 15 U.S.C. §
1640(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975), as amended by Act of Feb. 27, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-222,
§ 3(b), 90 Stat. 197; Act of Mar. 23, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-240, § 4, 90 Stat. 260. In this
regard, Zeltzer is preferable to Rodriguez in that the plain intent of the statute to allow
class actions is maintained. Allowing defendant's counterclaims in a class suit would
complicate the proceedings by introducing myriad factual issues not shared by the
plaintiff class as a whole. This added complexity would diminish any potential gain in
judicial economy and argues against treating such counterclaims as compulsory. It is also
possible to separate the class action issue under Rule 23 from the counterclaim question
under Rule 13. Under Rule 23(c)(4) the court may deny class treatment on the debt claim,
but permit the class action to proceed on the Truth in Lending issues.
81. 69 F.R.D. 437 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
82. 404 F. Supp. I (D. Mass. 1975).
83. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
84. 69 F.R.D. at 441-42.
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without the requisite disclosures, while the defendant would have to
set forth the underlying debt obligation and proof of default. 85 Thus,
the judicial efficiency sought by Rule 13 would not be furthered if
defendant's counterclaim was allowed. 86 Moreover, the court reasoned
that allowing the counterclaims would effectively frustrate the purpose
of the Truth in Lending Act by involving the court "in a myriad of
factual and legal questions that are logically unrelated to the alleged
Truth in Lending violations.'"87 The Agostine decision is a logical and
proper analysis of the problem. By considering the judicial subtests
and the policy of Rule 13, the court avoided being confused or diverted
by the transaction or occurrence language.
With similar logic, Ball looked directly to the purposes of Rule 13
without directly applying either the primary transaction or occurrence
test or any of the several judicial standards. Recognizing that the
design of Rule 13(a) is "to prevent multiplicity of actions and to
achieve resolution in a single lawsuit of all disputes arising out of
common matters," 88 the court found that permitting the debt counter-
claim would not further this goal.89 Although the court acknowledged
that the credit transaction linked the claims, it concluded that the
federal claim and state counterclaim stood on such uncommon ground
that "wooden application of the common transaction label does not
yield real judicial economy. ... 90
In contrast to these decisions are the cases holding a defendant's
debt counterclaim to be compulsory in a Truth in Lending action. 91
Few of these decisions, however, provide much insight into their
rationale for doing so. An exception is Mims v. Dixie Finance Corp. 92
which overruled the court's previous decision in Roberts.93 Recogniz-
ing that "the courts have given the compulsory counterclaim a very
liberal construction," 94 the Mims court found the defendant's claim to
85. Id. at 442.
86. Although the Agostine court does not draw this conclusion, it is the implicit
rationale behind the accepted tests for compulsoriness. See 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
supra note 77, at 43, and text accompanying note 28 supra.
87. 69 F.R.D. at 442. Agostine, like Zeltzer, was a class action suit. See note 80
supra.
88. 404 F. Supp. at 3 (quoting Southern Constr. Co. v. Pickard, 371 U.S. 57, 60
(1962)).
89. 404 F. Supp. at 4.
90. Id.
91. Mims v. Dixie Fin. Corp., 21 F.R. Serv. 2d 1042 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Gibson v.
Family Fin. Corp., 404 F. Supp. 896 (E.D. La. 1975); Kennedy v. Russell, Civil No.
17,486 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 18, 1974); Kenney v. Landis Fin. Group, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 852
(N.D. Iowa 1974).
92. 21 F.R. Serv. 2d 1042 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
93. Id. at 1048.
94. Id. at 1047.
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be logically related to that of the plaintiff95 because the claims of both
parties were "offshoots of the same basic transaction; namely, an
extension of credit." '96 Although purporting to examine the logical
relationship between the claims, the court slid into a direct application
of the transaction or occurrence test: "Manifestly, defendants'
counterclaims arise out of the same transaction as plaintiffs' Truth-in-
Lending claims. Both claims derive their basis from the same credit
transaction." 97 This superficial logic exemplifies the "wooden appli-
cation" of the common transaction test which was unacceptable in
Ball and Zeltzer. The analysis ignores the inherent divergence of the
claims and the illusory gain in judicial economy stressed in Zeltzer,
Ball, and Agostine.
In reaching this result the Mims court relied heavily on the
reasoning in Spartan Grain & Mill Co. v. Ayers. 98 In Spartan, an
action for the unpaid balance of a contract, the court stated that
defendant's counterclaim, asserted under the Truth in Lending Act,
was compulsory. The Mims court reached its result by inferring the
inverse: that a counterclaim made in response to a Truth in Lending
claim is also compulsory. 99 This reliance on Spartan is misplaced for
two reasons. First, Spartan only tangentially and fleetingly dealt with
this issue in the context of allowing a late amendment to the plead-
ings. 100 Second, the court clearly had jurisdiction of the counterclaim,
compulsory or permissive, conferred by the Truth in Lending Act. 10 1
Spartan is thus dicta on this point and is of tenuous precedential value.
The Spartan court found that the evidence necessary to prove the
95. Id. The logical relation test is one of the four accepted tests used to
determine compulsoriness. See text accompanying note 28 supra. Like the Zeltzer court,
the Mims court looked to Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d
631 (3d Cir. 1961), for guidance to determine whether such a logical relationship existed.
See note 77 supra.
96. 21 F.R. Serv. 2d at 1048.
97. Id. at 1047. The court also noted: "Even the court in Roberts found that the
plaintiff's Truth-in-Lending claim and the defendant's state claim arose from the same
transaction in the sense that each party was suing because of the other's obligation on the
note." Id. at 1046. The Mims court garnered further support for this position from
Kennedy v. Russell, Civil No. 17,486 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 18, 1974), which held a defendant's
debt counterclaim to be compulsory through direct application of the "transaction or
occurrence" test. 21 F.R. Serv. 2d at 1047.
98. 517 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1975).
99. 21 F.R. Serv. 2d at 1046: "In arriving at this holding, the Special Master rejects
as unpersuasive the argument that Spartan Grain is not entitled to stare decisis treatment
because it concerned a TIL counterclaim rather than a lender's counterclaim. To hold
otherwise would indeed produce an anomalous result." Id.
100. The court remarked: "The argument for allowing amendment is especially
compelling when, as here, the omitted counterclaim is compulsory . 517 F.2d at
220.
101. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
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plaintiff's contract claim would also show whether the proper disclo-
sures had been made to the borrower. 0 2 From this the Mims court
reasoned that those documents necessary to prove a Truth in Lending
violation would equally determine the validity of a counterclaim on the
underlying obligation. 1 3 Thus, the court found the "same evidence"
test for compulsoriness to be met,"° reinforcing its belief that judicial
economy would be gained by adjudicating both claims in the same
proceeding. 105
The Mims court failed to recognize that a Truth in Lending plain-
tiff must prove a much more limited set of facts than a plaintiff seeking
to recover a contractual debt. As indicated in Agostine'°6 and Zelt-
zer, 10 7 the Truth in Lending plaintiff need only prove the existence of a
credit contract and the failure of the lender to make the proper disclo-
sures in order to prevail in his suit. The terms of the contract and the
consumer's payments thereon are irrelevant in determining a lender's
liability under the Act. Conversely, these matters must be established
by a defendant seeking to recover the balance due on the credit
contract. 108 Consequently, if the contract claim has been established
the evidence relevant to a Truth in Lending counterclaim will probably
be before the court, but theconverse does not logically follow. Mims,
therefore, misplaces its reliance on Spartan to determine the result
where the defendant is counterclaiming for the balance due on the
contract. 109
As has been seen, the issue of whether to allow a defendant's debt
counterclaim in a Truth in Lending action has been problematic for the
courts. It has been difficult to determine whether under the transaction
or occurrence test of Rule 13(a) such a counterclaim is compulsory. A
direct application of the transaction test seemingly indicates that the
102. 517 F.2d at 220.
103. 21 F.R. Serv. 2d at 1046.
104. Id. See text accompanying note 28 supra. The first test was satisfied by the
logical relationship found to exist between claim and counterclaim.
105. 21 F.R. Serv. 2d at 1048.
106. 69 F.R.D. at 442.
107. 21 F.R. Serv. 2d at 1051.
108. Id.
109. The Mims court also argued that dismissing the counterclaim may impose
greater hardship on the defendant than the statutory penalties themselves. When ancil-
lary jurisdiction is denied, the defendant must subsequently pursue his claim in state
court.
In addition to incurring this added cost including more attorney fees, the
creditor may find itself with a state court judgment that is uncollectible or
collectible only after suffering additional costs of execution, although it earlier
had possibly been required to pay a judgment rendered in this court for a Truth-
in-Lending violation.
[Vol. 28:434
TRUTH IN LENDING
counterclaim is compulsory, since both plaintiff's and defendant's
claims derive from the transaction of credit extension. This rationale
was adopted in Mims and expressly acknowledged in Zeltzer.110
However, a more comprehensive analysis of the issues involved
demonstrates the distinction between the Truth in Lending claim and
the debt counterclaim. Through application of the judicial subtests
under Rule 13 the courts have revealed the distinct transactions upon
which the claims are based-a distinction implied by Roberts and
Zeltzer but one which has not been expressly isolated by the courts.
The cause of action of the Truth in Lending plaintiff, when he is suing
for the statutory penalty, is not based upon the credit contract itself,
but rather on the lender's failure to properly disclose the required
information. The questions of law and fact appropriate to the parties'
claims lack any close identity, and largely different evidence would be
required to support the two claims."' It is suggested that the act of
disclosure and that of credit extension are properly viewed as two
separate transactions. As recognized in Ball and Zeltzer, the combin-
ing of such dissimilar claims in a single action produces no real gain in
judicial economy and therefore does not further the policy underlying
Rule 13. The identity of claim and counterclaim found in Mims thus
seems to be superficial and invalid. It appears that the courts' struggle
with this problem arises from their failure to perceive this transactional
separability when directly applying the transaction or occurrence test
of Rule 13(a).
The Roberts court recognized at the outset the importance of
keeping within the purpose and design of the Truth in Lending Act.
The established purpose of the Act was "to create a species of private
attorneys general to participate prominently in [its] enforcement."' 12
Moreover, the civil recovery provision of section 1640(a)(2)113 has
been held to be a civil penalty rather than a damage provision intended
to make the borrower whole.114 Thus, a consumer suing for the
21 F.R. Serv. 2d at 1048. However, when the Truth in Lending cause of action was
created, it was obvious that the defendant would be burdened with the litigation cost. If
this is viewed as part of the penalty for violation of the statute, it is incongruous to grant
jurisdiction to the defendant's counterclaim, for in doing so the court relieves the lender
from the expense of a state debt collection suit.
110. 414 F. Supp. at 1225.
111. Zeltzer v. Carte Blanche Corp., 414 F. Supp. 1221, 1225 (W.D. Pa. 1976);
Agostine v. Sidcon Corp., 69 F.R.D. 437, 442 (E.D. Pa. 1975). See Ball v. Connecticut
Bank and Trust Co., 404 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D. Conn. 1975).
112. Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270,280 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
113. For the text of § 1640(a)(2), see note 4 supra.
114. Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973).
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statutory penalty is acting as a private attorney general to force the
lender's compliance with the Act's disclosure requirements rather than
as an individual seeking damages for injuries suffered on the credit
contract. Roberts and Agostine recognized that "[t]o permit the de-
fendant to pursue its claim in federal court would unduly complicate
the expeditious resolution of TIL litigation." 115 Although sensing the
incongruity of allowing the enforcement action to become a forum for
the violator's private grievance, Roberts did not articulate the true
reason for disallowing the defendant's counterclaim. To subject a
Truth in Lending plaintiff to the creditor's claim for the balance due on
the credit contract would seriously diminish consumers' incentive to
initiate enforcement actions. 116 Roberts missed the mark in stating that
the creditor's counterclaim would be "clearly prejudicial to the plain-
tiff's claim." 117 Rather, such counterclaims would be prejudicial to the
private enforcement scheme on which the Act is based.
These policy arguments, although persuasive in themselves, also
reveal another reason for considering the debt counterclaim permissive
under Rule 13. When the Truth in Lending action is viewed as an
enforcement proceeding rather than a private damage suit, the plain-
tiff's cause of action is clearly based on the strict disclosure require-
ments of the Act, not on the credit contract. This emphasizes the
separate nature of the disclosures and of the credit contract, facilitating
a straightforward application of the transaction or occurrence test. The
courts' collective reference to these events as an "extension of credit"
serves only to muddle the issue and the analysis." 8
III. COUNTERCLAIMS IN ACTIONS FOR
STATUTORY RESCISSION
The situation of a consumer suing for the statutory penalty can be
compared advantageously with actions for statutory rescission under
the Truth in Lending Act. 119 Under the Act, rescission is only available
115. Roberts v. National School of Radio & Television Broadcasting, 374 F. Supp.
1266, 1271 (N.D. Ga. 1974), overruled by Mims v. Dixie Fin. Corp., 21 F.R. Serv. 2d
1042 (N.D. Ga. 1976). A similar conclusion was expressed by the court in Agostine. 69
F.R.D. at 442-43.
116. This disincentive is especially strong in light of the minimal amount ($100) of
the statutory penalty. See note 4 supra.
117. 374 F. Supp. at 1271.
118. This concept contributed to the courts' confusion in Zeltzer, Mims, and
Roberts.
119. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), which provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, in the case of any
consumer credit transaction in which a security interest, including any such
interest arising by operation of law, is or will be retained or acquired in any real
property which is used or is expected to be used as the residence of the person
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when a security interest has been created in the consumer's resi-
dence, 120 as commonly occurs with large credit sales and home im-
provements. Unlike common law rescission, 121 the statute provides
that the consumer can exercise his right to rescind without first tender-
ing the consideration which he received. 122 Moreover, upon rescission
by the borrower, the creditor's security interest in the debtor's resi-
dence becomes void, 123 reducing the lender's claim to that of an
unsecured creditor. Although the courts have disagreed over whether
judicially ordered Truth in Lending rescission should be conditioned
on the debtor's repayment of the principal of the loan, 124 it is clear that
the consumer must ultimately repay the borrowed amount. 125 It has
to whom credit is extended, the obligor shall have the right to rescind the
transaction until midnight of the third business day following the consummation
of the transaction or the delivery of the disclosures required under this section
and all other material disclosures required under this part, whichever is later, by
notifying the creditor, in accordance with regulations of the Board, of his
intention to do so ...
(b) When an obligor exercises his right to rescind under subsection (a) of
this section, he is not liable for any finance or other charge, and any security
interest given by the obligor, including any such interest arising by operation of
law, becomes void upon such a rescission. Within ten days after receipt of a
notice of rescission, the creditor shall return to the obligor any money or
property given as earnest money, downpayment, or otherwise, and shall take
any action necessary or appropriate to reflect the termination of any security
interest created under the transaction. If the creditor has delivered any property
to the obligor, the obligor may retain possession of it. Upon the performance of
the creditor's obligations under this section, the obligor shall tender the proper-
ty to the creditor, except that if return of the property in kind would be
impracticable or inequitable, the obligor shall tender its reasonable value ....
See generally Note, Truth-in-Lending: Judicial Modification of the Right of Rescission,
1974 DUKE L.J. 1227; Note, Truth in Lending Act Litigation: Concurrent Recourse to
Rescission and The Civil Penalty, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 840 (1975); Comment, Private
Remedies Under the Truth-in-Lending Act: The Relationship Between Rescission and
Civil Liability, 57 IowA L. REV. 199 (1971).
120. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
121. See 17 AM. JUR. 2d Contracts § 512 (1964).
122. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
123. Id. Excluded from the coverage of this section, however, are first liens used to
finance acquisition of the residence and other specified liens. Id. § 1635(e); Regulation
Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(g) (1977).
124. Compare Palmer v. Wilson, 502 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1974), with Sosa v. Fite, 498
F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1974), and Hank's Auto Sales, Inc. v. Fisher, 38 Ohio App. 2d 1, 310
N.E.2d 259 (1973). See Ljepya v. M.L.S.C. Properties, 353 F. Supp. 866 (N.D. Cal.
1973), rev'd, 511 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1975). The judicial practice of conditioning rescission
on the debtor's tender of the principal has been severely criticized by commentators as
being contrary to the plain meaning and purpose of the Truth in Lending Act since the
creditor's security interest is thus effectively maintained. See Note, Truth-in-Lending:
Judicial Modification of the Right of Rescission, 1974 DUKE L.J. 1227; Note, Truth in
Lending Act Litigation: Concurrent Recourse to Rescission and the Civil Penalty, 43
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 840 (1975); Note, Truth in Lending-Right of Rescission, 1975
Wisc. L. REV. 192.
125. Where the credit sale involves goods or services, the property itself or its
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been suggested that the better method of dealing with the debtor's
repayment obligation is to incorporate this obligation into the court's
judgment of rescission, 126 and this result appears to have met with
judicial approval. 127
With respect to rescission, the specific language of the Act is
oriented to the rights and obligations of the debtor. 12 A specific
method for enforcing the debtor's repayment obligation is not pro-
vided. Although judicial authority is scarce, it has been recognized that
a creditor's assertion of his right to repayment is a compulsory
counterclaim. 129 Judge Thompson, concurring in Palmer v. Wilson,130
explicitly reached this result:
If a rescission is demanded and effectuated without litiga-
tion, [section 1635(b)] requires the obligor to return the prop-
erty or its reasonable value to the creditor. This, together
with the Act's failure to void the principal obligation along
with the security, is, for me, clear indication of Congression-
al intent that a complete windfall to the victim was not
intended.
In the present case, defendants did not counterclaim for
[the unpaid principal amount]. Under Rule 13(a) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, this is a compulsory counter-
claim and the cause of action is lost if not asserted."'
It would seem to follow by analogy, that in a Truth in Lending suit
for the civil penalty, a defendant's counterclaim should be allowed to
offset any recovery awarded to the plaintiff. This logic, however,
ignores the basic dichotomy between an action for rescission and one
for the statutory penalty. When a plaintiff seeks rescission, he is using
reasonable value must be tendered back to the creditor. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (1970 &
Supp. V 1975). See Palmer v. Wilson, 502 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1974) (Thompson, J.,
concurring); Sosa v. Fite, 498 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1974).
126. Incorporating [the] debtor's obligation into the court's judgment . . . meets
several objectives. First, it conforms with legislative intentions to unburden the
debtor of the security interest in his residence. It reflects the termination of the
security interest by leaving the parties in the relationship of unsecured creditor
and debtor. Yet it also reflects the debtor's obligation to return the con-
sideration received under the contract . ... In addition, since the loss of the
original security interest adversely affects [the] creditor's chance of recovering
the principal balance due, this alternative provides incentive for creditors to
comply with the Act in making initial contracts.
Note, Truth in Lending-Right of Rescission, 1975 Wisc. L. REV. 192, 202 (footnotes
omitted).
127. See Ljepava v. M.L.S.C. Properties, Inc., 511 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1975) (plain-
tiff's name spelled differently than in district court reporter); Eby v. Reb Realty, Inc.,
495 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1974).
128. See pertinent parts of § 1635(b) reprinted in note 119 supra.
129. Palmer v. Wilson, 502 F.2d 860, 863 (9th Cir. 1974) (Thompson, J., concurring);
Note, supra note 126, at 197.
130. 502 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1974).
131. Id. at 863 (emphasis original).
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the statutory cause of action to redress an injury caused by the credit
contract itself and should be allowed restitution but not a windfall. 132
Conversely, a plaintiff seeking the statutory penalty is acting in the
role of a "private attorney general" and should be afforded greater
immunity against the defendant's individual interests.
In a rescission suit, it is consonant with the transaction or occur-
rence test of Rule 13(a) to recognize the defendant's counterclaim as
compulsory. Although the statutory cause of action for rescission or
actual damages is triggered by the defendant's disclosure violations,
the claim itself, as well as the relevant evidence and remedy, is
grounded in the credit contract. Thus, in an action for rescission or
actual damages, unlike a suit for the statutory penalty, both claim and
counterclaim are based on the same transaction-the parties' credit
contract.
IV. CONCLUSION
Civil actions brought under the Truth in Lending Act by borrowers
against lenders are an integral and important aspect of the Act's
enforcement scheme. Maintaining a defendant's counterclaim for the
balance due on the credit contract, in an action for the civil penalty, is
not consonant with the purpose of the Act or the criteria for compul-
sory counterclaims under the Federal Rules. A creditor's debt
counterclaim should not be deemed compulsory, and thus accorded the
courts' ancillary jurisdiction, since it does not arise out of the same
transaction as the plaintiff's Truth in Lending claim. The combination
of two such distinct claims in a single suit produces little or no gain in
judicial economy and is therefore inconsistent with the purpose of the
Rules. Moreover, subjecting a plaintiff who is enforcing the disclosure
provisions of the Act to the private claims of the defendant would
impair the incentive for consumers to bring such suits. This would
significantly vitiate the private enforcement provisions of the Truth in
Lending Act and should not be sanctioned.
F. GIFFORD LANDEN
132. Similarly, a plaintiff who sues under § 1640(a)(1), see note 4 supra, for actual
damages suffered under the contract, would be exposed to a defendant's counterclaim
for the balance due. Presumably, the measure of actual damages would be the difference
between the contract cost of credit and the competitive price which the plaintiff could
have obtained had full disclosure been made and the plaintiff thus enabled to effectively
shop for credit. See Note, Truth in Lending Act Litigation: Concurrent Recourse to
Rescission and the Civil Penalty, 43 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 840, 855 n.105 (1975).
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